History of Trust Bank. Where do the roots come from? Bank "Trust": "a tough nut to crack" and the hammer of fate OJSC National Bank Trust

Child of Menatep's bankruptcy

The history of Trust Bank began back in 1995. The Moscow bank Menatep, controlled by the head of the Yukos oil company Mikhail Khodorkovsky, opened its “daughter” in St. Petersburg. The parent structure itself subsequently did not survive the 1998 crisis: Menatep’s license was revoked in May 1999, and in September the credit institution was declared bankrupt. The bank owes creditors about 40 billion rubles.

After this, part of the bank's assets was transferred to two other financial organizations controlled by Khodorkovsky: Menatep St. Petersburg and Trust Investment Bank (DIB). The first bank received the bank's branch network and card business, DIB received the majority of Yukos' financial flows.

“I entered Menatep like a hot knife through butter”

They say that Khodorkovsky noticed such a promising employee immediately

In 1994, long before the collapse, Ilya Yurov, a graduate of the Moscow Aviation Institute, who managed to work in the largest investment company France Compagnie Parisienne de Reescompte (CPR). He came to be hired at Khodorkovsky’s bank after reading an advertisement in the newspaper. And, they say, Khodorkovsky noticed such a promising employee immediately. “You can’t even imagine the extent of that financial illiteracy. A person who simply spoke English could already make a career,” Yurov said. “I walked into Menatep like a hot knife through butter,” he recalls.

Yurov worked as an economist in the marketing department, and a year later became head of the analytical department. From the second month of work, Yurov prepared analytical reports personally for Khodorkovsky. In 1999, Khodorkovsky invited Yurov to head the DIB. Yurov was then just hatching the idea of ​​creating an investment bank in a place scorched by the crisis financial market, and the bank owner approved this plan.

Trust accounted for more than 10% of the corporate bond market

Soon, DIB was renamed Trust Investment Bank. Business was extremely successful: in 2002–2003, the bank was first on the list of bond underwriters according to Cbonds. Trust accounted for more than 10% of the corporate bond market, and among its clients at that time were the largest companies: MGTS, Rusal, MegaFon, the governments of the Moscow region, Moscow and Yakutia.

By 2001, the bank's managers became partners with Yukos shareholders, purchasing 30% of Trust from the Menatep group.

Either sell or do something

In 2002, a consumer boom began in Russia, and bankers began to understand that lending to the population would begin to grow. In principle, the Menatep group had everything to start working in the market consumer lending. Bank Menatep St. Petersburg had 48 branches and access to cheap resources. Yurov proposed this idea to Khodorkovsky, but he had doubts: to calculate the risks then, in the emerging market retail lending, it was difficult. The negotiations dragged on for a long time and ended on their own in the summer of 2003. Then one of the main owners of the Menatep group, Platon Lebedev, was arrested. The group had no interest in retail banking business at all.

Throughout 2003 and 2004, bank employees were summoned for questioning

IB "Trust" also did not fare well: throughout 2003 and 2004, bank employees were summoned for questioning. Meanwhile, clients were leaving the bank. Yurov was faced with a dilemma: either sell his 30% in Trust IB, or try to do something.

Yurov felt sorry for the time spent on Trust. And youth and ambition allowed us to believe that there were no problems that could not be solved. The idea came up to get money somewhere and buy out 70% in Trust IB and 100% in Menatep St. Petersburg Bank. “We knew many investment bankers in the West. Friends contacted us - fairly high-ranking people from ING Bank - and said: if we come to an agreement with the Menatep group, they are ready to give us money,” Yurov was quoted as saying by Forbes.

It was very difficult, but Yurov managed to implement his plan in 2004. As a result, both banks – IB Trust and Menatep St. Petersburg – were bought out for $100 million. Bank Menatep St. Petersburg was renamed National Bank Trust, and in 2008 both banks were united under this brand.

Brutal "Trust"

The retail project was launched in 2006. "Trust" began lending to the population and small and medium-sized businesses. Yurov himself said, however, that they entered retail late - such monsters as the VTB Group and Sberbank were already working there with all their might.

In the spring of 2009, the face of the bank's advertising campaign was the athlete-bodybuilder, actor and showman Vladimir (Dynamite) Turchinsky. Using his image, various products with corresponding names were advertised. For example, the “Strong” deposit with a rate of 14.75% per annum. “Based on the fact that Trust is trust, reliability and strength, we chose Turchinsky,” said Nadiya Cherkasova, Chairman of the Board of Trust Bank, in an interview with the Banki.ru portal.

However, on the morning of December 16, 2009, it became known that the showman died suddenly of a heart attack. The bank employees were shocked. However, already in the middle of the day it was decided to stop the campaign with the image of Turchinsky. The bank reasonably considered the use of the image of a person who died untimely and suddenly to be incorrect. Banners and billboards with advertising were promptly removed.

Even more brutal “Trust”

After Turchinsky, in 2010, Trust Bank began using in its advertising the image of a Hollywood star, actor Bruce Willis, which was no less brutal. Before this, no bank in Russia invited such famous and expensive world celebrities to its campaigns.

"Die Hard" with the famous line "He's just like me. Only the Bank advertised the products and Trust itself for four years. Willis appeared on the Russian advertising market for the first time. In Eastern Europe, he has already appeared in an advertisement for Polish vodka.

The bank told how they were looking for a new advertising face - it turns out it didn’t take that long. Two top lists were formed - Russian and foreign celebrities. In addition to Willis, Brad Pitt was also considered. Ivan Urgant was in first place on the Russian list, but his perception index was half that of the “tough nut to crack.”

The amount of the contract with Willis, of course, was not announced by the bank. But advertising market participants estimated the Hollywood star's annual contract at $1.5 million.

Big bank - big reorganization

But Bruce Willis did not save the bank from another crisis: Trust’s obvious problems emerged in 2014. Although, as Vedomosti wrote, the bank had problems back in 2009. The bank's loan portfolio then amounted to 65 billion rubles. More than 60% of this portfolio accounted for projects of the bank’s largest beneficiaries - Chairman of the Board of Directors Yurov, member of the Board of Directors Nikolai Fetisov and Sergei Belyaev. The remaining share was used to restructure problem loans of shareholders and loans to friendly structures in order to maintain Central Bank standards.

The last straw was the panic of depositors, who withdrew money from banks at the end of 2014

Throughout 2014, the bank several times approached the minimum capital adequacy ratio of 5%. In March of that year, the bank carried out an additional issue of shares for 3.14 billion rubles, but this was enough until September. Having again approached the critical mark in terms of capital adequacy standards, the bank again wanted to carry out an additional issue, but the deal was hopeless: the shares were paid for by the building that the bank rented for the main office. The last straw was the panic of depositors, who at the end of 2014 took money from banks. A small outflow of 3 billion rubles was enough for Trust to collapse. And on December 22, 2014, the Bank of Russia decided to reorganize the bank.

Otkritie FC Bank was chosen as Trust’s sanator for rehabilitation credit organization The DIA allocated 127 billion rubles to him. Then CEO DIA Yuri Isaev stated that this money would be enough to rehabilitate Trust. However, a year later, Otkritie again asked the DIA for money - 47 billion rubles. Initially, the size of the “hole” in Trust was estimated at 68 billion rubles, but a few months later the volume of the shortage increased by 70% - to 114 billion rubles. The media explained this by saying that the schemes to “inflate” capital on the part of the former owners had stopped working, and half of the shortfall was made up of “scheme” assets.

The then deputy chairman of the Central Bank, Mikhail Sukhov, stated that the Trust’s reporting was falsified. In April 2015, law enforcement agencies opened a criminal case against former top managers of Trust for particularly large-scale fraud. As the investigation believed, the suspects acted not alone, but together with shareholders. Ilya Yurov, Nikolai Fetisov and Sergei Belyaev were arrested in absentia by a Russian court, but by that time the beneficiaries of the bank had not been in Russia for a long time.

The reorganization of Trust Bank became one of the largest in the history of the entire Russian financial system

The Trust Bank bailout was the largest in the history of Otkritie Bank and one of the largest in the history of the entire Russian financial system: it cost eight times more money than was stated in the original rescue plan.

Connoisseur of good cinema and music. Lover of black suits and sci-fi detective stories. The founder of the largest private bank in Russia, who lost his main “brainchild” in just a matter of weeks. the site presents: the brightest and Interesting Facts from the biography of Vadim Belyaev.

In Good we "Trust"

In the summer of 2017, the sanator of Trust itself, Otkritie Bank, which by the time of its collapse had become the largest private bank in the country, came under the Central Bank’s reorganization. Thus, on August 29, it was announced that a provisional administration of the Central Bank had been introduced into Otkritie Bank, that the banking group would come under the control of the regulator, and that the financial recovery procedure would begin through the new Banking Sector Consolidation Fund. From the beginning of 2018, the Otkritie team will be headed by the President and Chairman of the Board of VTB 24 Bank, Mikhail Zadornov.

Additional capitalization does not imply the provision of financial assistance to Trust

The regulator promised to maintain performance financial organizations and specialized services included in the Otkritie Bank group. Earlier in December, the Bank of Russia also approved changes to the plan for its participation in the rehabilitation of the Otkritie FC bank, which provide for additional capitalization of this credit institution by 456.2 billion rubles. However, additional capitalization does not imply the provision of financial assistance to the Trust. Will Die Hard survive this time?

When preparing the material, publications in publications were usedForbes, “Kommersant”, “Vedomosti”, Banki.ru,Finparty.

K:Banks founded in 1995

National Bank"Trust"- Russian commercial Bank. Since May 15, 2015, 100% of the shares of Trust Bank belong to OJSC Otkritie Holding. It underwent reorganization from December 22, 2014 to June 22, 2015. Why did the Central Bank of the Russian Federation provide the organization with a temporary repayable loan in the amount of 127 billion rubles?

Story

On December 31, 2002, Nefteyugansk Yuganskneftebank and Tomsk Nefteenergobank were merged with the bank.

In November 2006, National Bank Trust moved from St. Petersburg to Moscow, and two years later completed the long-announced deal to merge with Investment Bank Trust.

The bank has one of the largest networks of divisions in Russia (branches, credit and cash offices, operational offices, representative offices) and serves more than 2 million clients.

In 2013, the bank got rid of non-core assets and minimized costs by reducing the number of staff by 20-30%. Since the beginning of the year, a number of top managers have left NB Trust: Sergey Larchenko and Nadiya Cherkasova, who until recently served as Chairman of the Board of Trust National Bank and is now Senior Vice President of the Director of the Small Business Customer Service Department of VTB24. The Board of Directors of TRUST Bank included the Director of the Risk Management Unit, Evgeniy Ivanov, and the Financial Director of the bank, Evgeniy Romakov.

According to unofficial information from sources close to the bank, it is known that in order to stabilize the current situation, NB Trust is actively attracting specialists to “knock out debts” from loan debtors individuals and loans legal entities.

On December 22, 2014, the Bank of Russia decided on the financial recovery of OJSC National Bank TRUST and approved the Plan for the participation of the state corporation “Deposit Insurance Agency” (hereinafter referred to as the Agency) in preventing the bankruptcy of OJSC National Bank TRUST. During the reorganization, the powers of the bank's management bodies were suspended. A temporary administration has been introduced at Trust. According to the deputy head of the Central Bank, Mikhail Sukhov, the bank’s reporting, as it turned out, was falsified.

TRUST Bank works with private and corporate clients. The bank has one of the largest regional networks. As of December 2013, Trust is represented in 160 cities, customer service is provided in 246 offices throughout Russia.

TRUST is a participant in the system state insurance deposits of individuals, as well as a full member of the international payment associations Visa International and MasterCard International and one of the largest issuers of international payment cards in Russia.

Since 2011, the bank has offered its depositors to buy Eurobonds for which it was a borrower. The head office sent sales plans to the branches, according to which all clients whose deposits allowed them to purchase securities were processed. The minimum cost of securities was RUB 3,280,000. After the bank came under the control of the Otkritie holding, it refused to service Eurobonds. The bank also refused to repurchase Eurobonds in accordance with the agreements concluded with depositors. Otkritie is currently suing the Trust's investors with varying degrees of success.

Shareholders

Management

• Since April 26, 2016, Nikolai Mylnikov has been the Chairman of the Board of National Bank Trust.

Rosneft

National ratings

According to the results, Trust Bank ranks 8th in terms of debt portfolio volume by bank cards and demonstrates leading growth rates among the largest market participants (“Expert RA”). The bank ranks in terms of the volume of unsecured loans issued in the first half of 2013 (RBC.Rating). More information about the bank's ratings can be found at.

Rating assessment of the agency "RusRating" as of September 1, 2014 - .

In 2014 The rating agency "Expert RA" confirmed the credit rating of TRUST Bank at the level of "A.rm" "High level of creditworthiness".

In December 2014 The rehabilitation of Trust Bank will be carried out by the Otkritie financial corporation. For this, it received 127 billion rubles. The DIA allocated two credit lines to Trust. The first is 28 billion rubles to maintain liquidity. The amount must be repaid after 6 years. The second line is for 10 years. Amount - 99 billion.

Participation in professional associations

1. State Corporation "Deposit Insurance Agency"
2. Visa International
3. MasterCard Worldwide
4. Diners Club LTD
5. OJSC "RTS Stock Exchange"
6. CJSC Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX)
7. CJSC "MICEX Stock Exchange"
8. Non-profit partnership "Moscow Stock Exchange"
9. Non-profit organization "Association of Bill Market Participants" (AUVER)
10. National Stock Association (NSA)
11. National Members Association stock market(NAUFOR)
12. National Monetary Association (NMA)
13. Moscow International Monetary Association (MIMA)
14. Russian National Association of Members of S.W.I.F.T.
15. International Association ICMA
16. International EMTA Association
17. International ISDA Association

see also

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• on the website banki.ru

An excerpt characterizing the National Bank "Trust"

Prince Andrei only shrugged his shoulders at Pierre's childish speeches. He pretended that such nonsense could not be answered; but indeed it was difficult to answer this naive question with anything other than what Prince Andrei answered.
“If everyone fought only according to their convictions, there would be no war,” he said.
“That would be great,” said Pierre.
Prince Andrei grinned.
- It may very well be that it would be wonderful, but it will never happen...
- Well, why are you going to war? – asked Pierre.
- For what? I don't know. That's how it should be. Besides, I’m going... - He stopped. “I’m going because this life that I lead here, this life is not for me!”

A woman's dress rustled in the next room. As if waking up, Prince Andrei shook himself, and his face took on the same expression that it had in Anna Pavlovna’s living room. Pierre swung his legs off the sofa. The princess entered. She was already in a different, homely, but equally elegant and fresh dress. Prince Andrei stood up, politely moving a chair for her.
“Why, I often think,” she spoke, as always, in French, hastily and fussily sitting down in a chair, “why didn’t Annette get married?” How stupid you all are, messurs, for not marrying her. Excuse me, but you don’t understand anything about women. What a debater you are, Monsieur Pierre.
“I keep arguing with your husband too; I don’t understand why he wants to go to war,” said Pierre, without any embarrassment (so common in the relationship of a young man to a young woman) addressing the princess.
The princess perked up. Apparently, Pierre's words touched her to the quick.
- Oh, that’s what I’m saying! - she said. “I don’t understand, I absolutely don’t understand, why men can’t live without war? Why do we women don’t want anything, don’t need anything? Well, you be the judge. I tell him everything: here he is his uncle’s adjutant, the most brilliant position. Everyone knows him so much and appreciates him so much. The other day at the Apraksins’, I heard a lady ask: “est ca le fameux prince Andre?” Ma parole d'honneur! [Is this the famous Prince Andrei? Honestly!] – She laughed. - He is so accepted everywhere. He could very easily be an aide-de-camp. You know, the sovereign spoke to him very graciously. Annette and I talked about how this would be very easy to arrange. How do you think?
Pierre looked at Prince Andrei and, noticing that his friend did not like this conversation, did not answer.
- When are you leaving? - he asked.
- Ah! ne me parlez pas de ce depart, ne m"en parlez pas. Je ne veux pas en entendre parler, [Oh, don’t tell me about this departure! I don’t want to hear about it," the princess spoke in such a capriciously playful tone, like she spoke to Hippolyte in the living room, and who obviously did not go to the family circle, where Pierre was, as it were, a member - Today, when I thought that I needed to break off all these dear relationships... And then, you know, Andre? She blinked significantly at her husband. “J"ai peur, j"ai peur! [I'm scared, I'm scared!] she whispered, shaking her back.
The husband looked at her as if he was surprised to notice that someone else besides him and Pierre was in the room; and he turned inquiringly to his wife with cold politeness:
– What are you afraid of, Lisa? “I can’t understand,” he said.
– That’s how all men are selfish; everyone, everyone is selfish! Because of his own whims, God knows why, he abandons me, locks me in the village alone.
“With your father and sister, don’t forget,” Prince Andrei said quietly.
- Still alone, without my friends... And he wants me not to be afraid.
Her tone was already grumbling, her lip lifted, giving her face not a joyful, but a brutal, squirrel-like expression. She fell silent, as if finding it indecent to talk about her pregnancy in front of Pierre, when that was the essence of the matter.
“Still, I don’t understand, de quoi vous avez peur, [What are you afraid of," Prince Andrei said slowly, without taking his eyes off his wife.
The princess blushed and waved her hands desperately.
- Non, Andre, je dis que vous avez tellement, tellement change... [No, Andrei, I say: you have changed so, so...]
“Your doctor tells you to go to bed earlier,” said Prince Andrei. - You should go to bed.
The princess said nothing, and suddenly her short, whiskered sponge began to tremble; Prince Andrei, standing up and shrugging his shoulders, walked around the room.
Pierre looked in surprise and naively through his glasses, first at him, then at the princess, and stirred, as if he, too, wanted to get up, but was again thinking about it.
“What does it matter to me that Monsieur Pierre is here,” the little princess suddenly said, and her pretty face suddenly blossomed into a tearful grimace. “I’ve been wanting to tell you for a long time, Andre: why did you change so much towards me?” What I did to you? You're going to the army, you don't feel sorry for me. For what?
- Lise! - Prince Andrey just said; but in this word there was a request, a threat, and, most importantly, an assurance that she herself would repent of her words; but she continued hastily:
“You treat me like I’m sick or like a child.” I see everything. Were you like this six months ago?
“Lise, I ask you to stop,” said Prince Andrei even more expressively.
Pierre, who became more and more agitated during this conversation, stood up and approached the princess. He seemed unable to bear the sight of tears and was ready to cry himself.
- Calm down, princess. It seems like this to you, because I assure you, I myself experienced... why... because... No, excuse me, a stranger is superfluous here... No, calm down... Goodbye...
Prince Andrei stopped him by the hand.
- No, wait, Pierre. The princess is so kind that she will not want to deprive me of the pleasure of spending the evening with you.
“No, he only thinks about himself,” said the princess, unable to hold back her angry tears.
“Lise,” said Prince Andrei dryly, raising his tone to the degree that shows that patience is exhausted.
Suddenly the angry, squirrel-like expression of the princess’s beautiful face was replaced by an attractive and compassion-arousing expression of fear; She glanced from under her beautiful eyes at her husband, and on her face appeared that timid and confessing expression that appears on a dog, quickly but weakly waving its lowered tail.
- Mon Dieu, mon Dieu! [My God, my God!] - said the princess and, picking up the fold of her dress with one hand, she walked up to her husband and kissed him on the forehead.
“Bonsoir, Lise, [Good night, Liza,” said Prince Andrei, getting up and politely, like a stranger, kissing his hand.

The friends were silent. Neither one nor the other began to speak. Pierre looked at Prince Andrei, Prince Andrei rubbed his forehead with his small hand.
“Let’s go have dinner,” he said with a sigh, getting up and heading to the door.
They entered the elegantly, newly, richly decorated dining room. Everything, from napkins to silver, earthenware and crystal, bore that special imprint of novelty that happens in the household of young spouses. In the middle of dinner, Prince Andrei leaned on his elbow and, like a man who has had something on his heart for a long time and suddenly decides to speak out, with an expression of nervous irritation in which Pierre had never seen his friend before, he began to say:
– Never, never get married, my friend; Here's my advice to you: don't get married until you tell yourself that you did everything you could, and until you stop loving the woman you chose, until you see her clearly; otherwise you will make a cruel and irreparable mistake. Marry an old man, good for nothing... Otherwise, everything that is good and lofty in you will be lost. Everything will be spent on little things. Yes Yes Yes! Don't look at me with such surprise. If you expect something from yourself in the future, then at every step you will feel that everything is over for you, everything is closed except for the living room, where you will stand on the same level as a court lackey and an idiot... So what!...
He waved his hand energetically.
Pierre took off his glasses, causing his face to change, showing even more kindness, and looked at his friend in surprise.
“My wife,” continued Prince Andrei, “is a wonderful woman.” This is one of those rare women with whom you can be at peace with your honor; but, my God, what I wouldn’t give now not to be married! I’m telling you this alone and first, because I love you.
Prince Andrei, saying this, looked even less like than before that Bolkonsky, who was lounging in Anna Pavlovna’s chair and, squinting through his teeth, spoke French phrases. His dry face was still trembling with the nervous animation of every muscle; the eyes, in which the fire of life had previously seemed extinguished, now shone with a radiant, bright shine. It was clear that the more lifeless he seemed in ordinary times, the more energetic he was in these moments of almost painful irritation.
“You don’t understand why I’m saying this,” he continued. – After all, this is a whole life story. You say Bonaparte and his career,” he said, although Pierre did not talk about Bonaparte. – You say Bonaparte; but Bonaparte, when he worked, walked step by step towards his goal, he was free, he had nothing but his goal - and he achieved it. But tie yourself to a woman, and like a shackled convict, you lose all freedom. And all that you have of hope and strength, everything only weighs you down and torments you with remorse. Living rooms, gossip, balls, vanity, insignificance - this is a vicious circle from which I cannot escape. I am now going to war, to the greatest war that has ever happened, but I know nothing and am no good for anything. “Je suis tres aimable et tres caustique, [I am very sweet and very eater,” continued Prince Andrei, “and Anna Pavlovna listens to me.” And this stupid society, without which my wife and these women cannot live... If only you could know what it is toutes les femmes distinguees [all these women of good society] and women in general! My father is right. Selfishness, vanity, stupidity, insignificance in everything - these are women when they show everything as they are. If you look at them in the light, it seems that there is something, but nothing, nothing, nothing! Yes, don’t get married, my soul, don’t get married,” Prince Andrei finished.
“It’s funny to me,” said Pierre, “that you consider yourself incapable, that your life is a spoiled life.” You have everything, everything is ahead. And you…
He didn’t say you, but his tone already showed how highly he valued his friend and how much he expected from him in the future.

Reputation management and crisis communications consultant.

From “Menatep” to “Trust” or what to do with someone else’s reputation?

In the shadow of YUKOS: what should a bank that no one trusts do? The effect of the YUKOS case, which ended with the sale of the company's main assets, was like an ocean storm in terms of the degree of destructiveness for the business of its owners - the Menatep group. Businesses that had any connection with YUKOS began to be assessed by the market as unreliable, and the fear “this could happen to anyone” canceled out all the efforts the company had previously spent on building a strong reputation. Thus, the once positive reputation of YUKOS turned into a threat of serious financial losses for its owners, the Menatep group, who had to look for ways to save their other assets that were quickly losing trust and value: the banks IB Trust and OJSC Menatep SPb.

The ability of the Menatep group companies to fulfill their obligations to shareholders and clients, in the light of the development of the YUKOS case, raised logical doubts. The banks belonging to the group suffered the most from this. The arrest of the chairman of the board of directors of the Menatep subsidiary, Platon Lebedev, as part of one of the cases against YUKOS and the initiation of criminal cases against the Menatep St. Petersburg bank in 2003 completely undermined the reputation of the Menatep brand. This immediately manifested itself in an increase in the interest of law enforcement agencies and a decrease in the ratings of international agencies with a vague prospect of an increase depending on the resolution of criminal and tax claims against Menatep SPb. In fact, the Menatep group not only suffered losses associated with the YUKOS case, but also faced the need for additional investments in banks, the market confidence in which became less and less, the longer Menatep tried to revive it.

Initially, in the struggle to save its banking business, the Menatep group reorganized its assets into a financial holding company of the same name, which included the Trust investment bank, Menatep SPb OJSC, a non-state Pension Fund“Progress-Trust” and management company“Trust Capital”. The ownership rights to both banks were first partially, and then completely, sold to a team of managers led by Ilya Yurov, who was responsible for the future of the newly acquired assets. The strategy of Yurov’s team as managers, and then owners, of Trust and Menatep SPb banks pursued two main goals:

- “detuning” from the Menatep brand and connections with YUKOS (change of management and names of banks);

Working with the image and reputation of banks (inviting a foreign specialist, conservative management policy, active communication with the media, disclosing a new ownership structure).

Considering the fact that the members of the new team of managers of the banks “Trust” and “Menatep SPb” were their co-owners, their direct interest in the speedy restoration of previous business volumes ensured the readiness for the necessary degree of dedication to the business started in critical conditions.

To be with “Menatep” or not to be? To be - not for long.

The management of the Menatep Group holding clearly understood that the root of the problems of Trust and Menatep SPb was their proximity to the parent company, and through it to YUKOS. The concerns of foreign shareholders, the arrest of a key person, and the persistent interest of law enforcement agencies created serious pressure on the management of banks. And although formally “Trust” and “Menatep SPb” were part of the holding, Yurov’s team understood that sooner or later the “link” to “Menatep” and, consequently, to YUKOS, would become a stumbling block in the development of the holding because of the associated brands threats of instability and dependence on negatively-minded influential structures. And the sooner Yurov’s team could draw a conditional line in the eyes of the public between banks and the Menatep brand, the higher the chances of saving the business.

A striking example of the development opportunities for banks in the event of dissociation from the Menatep brand and its connection with YUKOS was the increase in the long-term Standard & Poors rating of Trust Bank to the level of Alfa Bank in the fall of 2003. At the same time, a series of searches are taking place in the offices of a member of the same holding, Bank Menatep SPb, as a result of which a criminal case will be opened against the bank in the winter. And all this despite the fact that both banks were managed, in fact, by the same team of managers, and both boards of directors were headed by Ilya Yurov. The difference between the banks and the reason for the misadventures of Menatep SPb was that it was clearly unaffiliated with the disgraced company - YUKOS.

The first step towards disassociation from the Menatep brand at the management level was taken when the boards of directors of both banks of the holding were “staffed” by Trust managers, and the reshuffle in the management of the banks ended with the replacement of the only remaining representative of Menatep SPb - Chairman of the Board Dmitry Lebedev - member of the board of directors of both banks Oleg Kolyada. Thus, the only thing that formally connected the banks with Menatep after all the internal reshuffles was the name of one of them.

In addition to internal changes, Yurov’s team worked on building a new image for banks. Since the main reputational risk for Trust and Menatep SPb remained the impact of the situation around YUKOS, which was actively discussed in the media, Yurov’s team developed a number of key messages for clients and investors. The main topic of external communications was the reorganization of the banks’ work, aimed at ensuring that the influence of the “YUKOS case” on the work of both banks did not increase, but weakened. In his statements, Ilya Yurov paid special attention to the principles of transparency in the work of banks, the willingness of shareholders to invest in their development programs, and even mentioned long-term plans to enter an IPO in 2-3 years.

Regular appearances by the management of banks Trust and Menatep SPb in the media pursued two main goals as part of the strategy of dissociation from the Menatep brand. First of all, demonstrate the willingness of shareholders and management to invest in the long-term development of banks: the stated development strategy for 3 years and the signing of an implementation contract electronic system to increase the competitiveness of retail banking products and services. The fact that the management and shareholders of banks made such long-term and costly decisions should have made the general public understand that, despite the difficult situation, the desire and opportunity to invest in business development have only increased, which means that there is no threat of banks not fulfilling their obligations.

The second goal of Yurov’s team’s communications strategy was to show the general public that the situation around YUKOS, despite all its seriousness, was not perceived by bank management as an evil fate. Ilya Yurov himself has repeatedly emphasized that the YUKOS case is more likely to attract interest to Trust and Menatep SPb than to harm their reputation.

Colleagues and Varangians will help in a crisis.

The specificity of the banking business, including investment banking, is that its basis is trust, which is difficult to gain and measure, but easy to lose. And the speed and degree of loss of trust in the banking market largely depends on how much a reputable source disseminates positive or negative information about the bank’s work and how the bank itself reacts to it. Moreover, information disseminated by the bank itself, although necessary, is not in itself the basis for assessing the bank’s position in the market. Rather, it is intended to be verifiable using data from independent sources.

Some of the most influential independent sources of information on the performance of banks are rating agencies and the management of other reputable banks in the market. The former determine the reliability of banks, and the latter compete and collect information about each other. The team of managers of the banks “Trust” and “Menatep SPb” had to deal with the contradictory reaction of rating agencies and “colleagues” in the industry to the events taking place around the Menatep holding.

When the investigative committee of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs published a statement about the initiation of a criminal case against Menatep SPb for tax evasion, the bank’s ratings from the international agencies S&P and Finch, which, to the delight of Yurov’s team, remained unchanged for three months, fell sharply. The wording of the claims against the bank was too reminiscent of the claims against YUKOS. Information about tax claims and a drop in ratings dealt a serious blow to the holding’s reputation, since the loss of trust of one of its members invariably led to a decrease in trust in the rest, and consequently to direct financial losses.

In particular, the reputation of Trust Bank was under threat, investment activities which implied operating with significant sums of money, clients entrusted to the bank. And since Trust’s client portfolio in 2003 consisted of a small number of large clients (a third of the amount of deposits for 10 clients), the loss of even one of them could cause serious problems with the bank’s financial obligations.

Unexpectedly, industry analysts and representatives of other banks saved Trust and Menatep SPb from public indignation. In light of the YUKOS case, claims against banks should have caused a clearly negative market reaction, since information about tax evasion by a financial structure poses a serious threat to the funds of clients and shareholders entrusted to it. However, a number of industry analysts and executives of large banks have publicly stated the practice of many banks using legal schemes to optimize tax payments. The financial director of the International Bank of St. Petersburg even noted that without the use of such schemes, many banks would not be able to survive in the existing conditions.

The low level of public trust in government agencies turned out to be useful for Yurov’s team, especially in light of the approaching time for the reports of the banks “Trust” and “Menatep SPb” on the results of the year. A potential scandal in the media associated with another “fact of dishonesty” of banks of a well-known holding company was, in fact, extinguished before it even began. Moreover, it was “extinguished” not by those involved in tax prosecution, but by their competitors. And they did this not at all out of industry solidarity. Simply bringing to an end the case of non-payment of taxes by Menatep SPb would mean the potential possibility of filing similar claims against most Russian banks.

And yet, repelling “external attacks” alone was not enough to restore the reputation of Trust and Menatep St. Petersburg. The end of 2003 was approaching - the time for revealing the not very brilliant results of the banks' struggle to get out of the shadow of YUKOS. And the bank development strategy announced in the fall by the end of the year required confirmation and publication of specific steps. The current situation rather required a crisis response plan, the public adoption of which, along with the benefits for the holding, would strengthen the image of banks in the eyes of the public and banking market players as victims of a crisis situation, which, instead of working for clients, are engaged in their own salvation. Such an image had a high chance of triggering an outflow of clients and further aggravating the financial problems of Trust and Menatep SPb.

To avoid the destructive effect of good intentions, the arrival of a new chief managing director, Chris Evans, at Menatep SPb was immediately commented on by himself. Evans noted that he came to the bank not as a crisis manager, but as a specialist with experience in resolving complex situations in the banking business; specifically - to redirect the bank's efforts to attract customers. Evans' restructuring strategy included introducing a new hierarchy, segmenting products by customer audience, and standardizing internal procedures to avoid duplication of effort. The program was commented in detail for the media by representatives of the bank in order to avoid misinterpretation and create positive expectations from the work of the bank under the new command. Evans's arrival at Menatep SPb was viewed by bank management not only as a management decision, but was also used as an image move to reinforce the public's belief that the bank was investing in its development and was determined to reach a new level of work.

The arrival at the end of the year of a new managing director with a clear strategy for restructuring the business of Menatep SPb came at a very opportune time as a positive counterbalance to the unenviable results of the bank’s activities in 2003 (a decrease in assets by 0.4%, customer funds by 26.5%, balance sheet profit by 50 %). To ensure the most positive market perception of the processes taking place in banks, the financial management of Menatep SPb and Trust published not dry data, but their vision of the dynamics of the bank’s work. The essence of the communications of the bank management was that the performance indicators for the year were due to the restructuring process, and not to any wrong decisions, and in the current situation with the persecution of YUKOS and Menatep SPb, they can be considered an achievement.

Such statements would hardly reassure the public if they came only from bank management. However, for the second time, industry analysts and bankers began to speak out in defense of the reputation of the banks “Menatep SPb” and “Trust”, who spoke positively about the results of the banks’ work in the conditions created around the holding. The decrease in individual deposits, in their opinion, could occur not only as a result of the loss of clients, but, say, as a result of optimization of the bank’s activities. And the ratings, they say, rather reflected the loss of market positions of banks, and were not the reason for this.

Such “solidarity” was explained by the specifics of the current situation. The public activity of the management of Menatep SPb and Trust and the announced plans for serious strategic investments against the backdrop of the persecution of YUKOS and tax proceedings against Menatep SPb turned the banks in the eyes of the public from losers into “martyrs” trying to survive in difficult and independent times. them in harsh conditions. In addition, there was no confidence that a similar situation would not repeat with any other bank.

“Menatep SPb” is sold - long live “Trust”!

Against the backdrop of ongoing tax and criminal proceedings, reductions and recalls international ratings, jumps in the capitalization of YUKOS depending on court decisions against the company, the market capitalization of the banks of the Menatep holding decreased. During the second half of 2003, the total assets of IB Trust and OJSC Menatep SPb decreased by almost half, and private deposits by almost a third. As a result of consideration of proposals for the purchase of controlling stakes in IB Trust and OJSC Menatep SPb, at the end of 2004, the property rights were purchased by the management of the two banks. The sale of the banking business was a forced measure for the Menatep Group holding, since, despite the efforts of the new management of the banks, they were steadily losing value as assets.

The repurchase of the shares of Trust and Menatep SPb allowed the new owners to complete the disassociation from the Menatep brand, which began with the change in the composition of the boards of directors of banks, and set a course for restoring the reputation of the banks. Ilya Yurov’s team began the “restoration work” by changing the name of OJSC “Menatep SPb” to the National Bank “Trust”. The unification of bank names was followed by a series of detailed comments by Ilya Yurov for the media regarding the new ownership structure of banks and their further work. The main emphasis in communications has shifted from responding to “attacks” from the external environment to announcing the results of positive changes in the operating structure of banks and, now final, the independence of the results of the banks’ work from the outcome of the YUKOS case.

Shortly before the new year, Ilya Yurov announced the start of serious work on the reputation of Trust banks - investment and retail. According to bank management, separating the activities of the two Trusts will ensure focus and quality of work with clients and partners. Owners, unencumbered by lawsuits and problems of affiliated structures, for whom banking business is a priority and not an additional activity, have the opportunity to rebuild the reputation of banks anew. Whether they succeed or not, time will tell.

According to the deputy chairman of the Central Bank, Mikhail Sukhov, clients took more than 3 billion rubles from the bank and the bank could no longer fulfill clients’ orders in full (Interfax). According to a source close to the bank, the outflow was significantly more than 3 billion, but less than 10 billion rubles. In total, Trust, according to its reporting, attracted more than 144 billion rubles from the population, which is 61% of the bank’s liabilities with a capital of 29 billion rubles. Starting this week, the bank increased deposit rates to 21% per annum in rubles and 8% in foreign currency.

“The bank’s problems have been known for a long time: it has a low capital adequacy ratio of 10.76% (the required minimum is 10%), as well as low-yielding assets. If it weren’t for the outflow of deposits, the bank could have stayed afloat for a long time,” says Pavel Samiev, general director of Expert RA.

“This is the paradox of our banking system: all “leaky” banks work normally until one day you read on the Central Bank website - reorganization, temporary administration or revocation of a license. And before that, everything works great,” notes one of the former Trust managers.

To save Trust, the Central Bank, through the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA), will provide the bank with 30 billion rubles. In the coming days, the DIA will decide on the bank's reorganizer, for the rehabilitation of which there are several applicants. Among them are MDM Bank and B&N Bank, which have officially declared their intentions, as well as, according to sources, Promsvyazbank and Otkritie FC.

A source close to the board of directors of Trust hopes that assistance in the amount of several billion rubles will be enough to restore liquidity. However, Sukhov stated that the bank’s reporting is unreliable and the value of its assets is significantly less than the value of its liabilities. Consequently, the amount that the sanatorium receives may increase.

The press service of Trust explained to Forbes that the bank appealed to the regulator for financial support based on the results of consultations with the Central Bank. However, the DIA states that the decision to reorganize the bank was made at the initiative of the Central Bank. Sukhov claims that the bank’s shareholders did not express a desire in any way to further participate in the fate and activities of the bank.

Forbes sources say that Yurov has long settled in London and has not been to Russia often lately.

The bank's largest owners are the head of the board of directors, Yurov, as well as board members Nikolai Fetisov and Sergei Belyaev. They created Trust Bank on the basis banking assets YUKOS, bought back in 2004.

Last week they planned to recapitalize the bank by completing an additional issue of 3 billion rubles. Payment for the shares included an office building on Spartakovskaya Street, rented by the bank. However, the Central Bank refused to approve the placement results based on the assessment of the building. As a result, the board of directors, urgently assembled on Saturday, approved a new estimate, which turned out to be less than 1.4 billion rubles, which is why the number of outstanding shares was halved.

This isn't the first strange stock offering this year. At the end of March, Trust conducted an initial public offering of shares on the Moscow Exchange in the amount of 3.1 billion rubles. The main part of the issue was purchased by the former head of the Trust's debt instruments department, Piotr Pieka (8.5%). The additional issue was accompanied by a comparable increase in loans to non-residents, which is often evidence of improper capital formation. However, then the bank explained this as a coincidence - a conversion of foreign currency debt into rubles was carried out, which had nothing to do with the issue of shares.

The issue of shares did not help the bank solve its problems: the fixed capital adequacy ratio never exceeded 5.5%. The Central Bank requires compliance with this standard at a level of at least 5%, and shows increased attention to those who fall short of 5.5%. In total, this year seven banks from time to time fell short of the specified level, and Trust Bank constantly did so.

The bank’s reporting under IFRS was also alarming. In their report for 2012, Deloitte auditors noted that in 2010-2011 the bank issued almost 9 billion rubles at a non-market rate of 7% on average. At the same time, the average rate on funds raised from clients in Trust was much higher - 11.6%. The press service could not explain the economic meaning of the distribution of money, but insisted that the borrowers are not associated with the bank and shareholders, and the loans are repayable and secured by real estate.

“These loans are a loop of losses and capital,” says a source familiar with the Trust’s internal reporting. According to him, the bank transferred bad assets to its own special companies that were not consolidated in the reporting. They acquired assets through “pass companies” on credit funds the bank itself. This is the simplest method that banks use when drawing statements - this way you can hide losses or fictitiously increase capital. The main losses in 2010-2011, according to a Forbes interlocutor, were related to retail - the bank unsuccessfully began large-scale issuance of loans in retail networks and cash loans.

Another oddity that Daylot pointed out in a note to its 2013 financial statements was the bank’s assessment of liquidity risks. Deloitte partner Ekaterina Ponomareva indicated that the bank’s ability to continue its activities depends on maintaining its client base. The liquidity gap between assets and liabilities up to a year reached gigantic proportions - 40% (58 billion rubles) at the beginning of 2013 and 54% (89 billion rubles) at the beginning of 2014. According to Forbes, this is the worst indicator among banks in the Top 50, and alarming banking analysts The figure is considered to be 30%.

The bank wrote in the report that in fact it does not have a negative liquidity gap. According to the bank’s calculations, the lack of liquidity could be replaced by financing from the Central Bank secured by securities in the amount of almost 7 billion rubles, as well as funds from new depositors.

“A large liquidity gap arose because Trust financed long-term losses for up to a year with short-term funds from investors. As soon as the depositors took their money, the bank came to an end,” says a Forbes source.

According to him, a bank without capital can exist for a very long time. To serve deposit portfolio volume of 120-140 billion rubles, the bank needs liquidity of only 8 billion rubles for cash registers and ATMs, explains Forbes’ source.

Sukhov yesterday estimated the hole in Trust's capital at tens of billions of rubles and said that this could become a reason to contact law enforcement agencies.

The bankers who convinced rich depositors to voluntarily give up their money, the rescuers of these depositors, who received 127 billion rubles from the budget, but never paid the money... The former owners of Trust Bank were arrested in absentia, the prosecutor's office is already interested in the reorganization of the bank. The financial recovery of the Trust could ultimately cost the state a record amount.

IRINA BEGIMBETOVA

Vyacheslav Malafeev, like other eminent investors, refuses to talk about his financial losses at Trust Bank. Most likely, we are talking about multimillion-dollar losses: his own business (real estate agency M-16) brings the famous goalkeeper as much as a contract with Zenit. Malafeev recently spoke about this, but he promised to publish exact earnings only after the contract with Zenit expires, on June 30. Perhaps after this it will be easier for him to make statements about the Trust. However, in any case, the prospects for returning the deposit seem vague.

Since August 2011, the bank began offering clients whose accounts started with 3 million rubles to transfer money from deposits to credit notes (type valuable papers). Trust sold notes to clients until the last day before the reorganization in December 2014. In 2015, after the introduction of a financial recovery regime, the bank canceled its obligations under the notes. It is not known exactly how many clients and for what amount Trust sold credit notes, but according to estimates of an initiative group formed from among the victims, about 2 thousand people bought the notes for about 20 billion rubles.

Since last year, security holders have been trying to get their money back through the courts. As Radik Lotfullin, head of the insolvency and bankruptcy practice at Nektorov, Saveliev & Partners (the firm represents the interests of some note holders in the courts), told Dengi, Trust hid from its clients the true risks of purchasing securities. In particular, the bank argued that the client would lose the money invested in the notes only in the event of the bank's license being revoked and bankruptcy. However, the bank wrote off four of the seven note issues on the basis that its capital adequacy standards had fallen below the minimum value (2%) and a reorganization regime was introduced in the bank. Such conditions were included in the subordinated loan agreements between the bank and the Dutch companies C.R.R. B.V. and CL Repackaging, which acted as issuers of the securities. The bank wrote off the remaining issues, guided by new changes in the law on banks and banking activities. True, they came into force after the introduction of reorganization in the bank.

For the bank itself, the transfer of client investments from deposits to notes provided several advantages. "Trust" did not pay contributions to the Deposit Insurance Agency (securities, unlike deposits, do not need to be insured), in addition, the notes increased the bank's capital.

Most of the cases of credit note holders are considered by the Basmanny District Court of Moscow, which refuses claims from Trust clients. “It is clear to us that the court is biased,” says Radik Lotfullin. “How else can we explain the fact that the court ignored all our arguments and evidence, including the testimony of five bank employees, according to which depositors were not told about the risk of cancellation of credit notes.”

So far, note holders have been able to win cases only in the regions: decisions were made in favor of the plaintiffs, according to Alexander Ochkov, a representative of the initiative group, in 20 cases. "I had simple strategy: transactions for the purchase of credit notes violated the law on the protection of consumer rights, explains the logic of his victory, Alexander Sergeev, head of the department civil law and the process of the St. Petersburg branch of the Higher School of Economics.— The bank did not have the right to offer securities to depositors who do not have the status of a qualified investor. The bank assigned status to clients, but clearly in violation of the procedure, through imaginary transactions: clients were given five contracts to sign for the purchase of securities and immediately five contracts for their sale. And all in one package with credit notes!"

First, the Kuibyshevsky District Court of St. Petersburg, and then the City Court, sided with Sergeev. At the end of April, the latter's decision came into force. True, the bank can appeal it in cassation within six months. Another of the cases, in which Honored Doctor of Karelia Vladimir Olshevsky is the plaintiff, has reached the Supreme Court of Russia, which will hear the case on June 7.

Originally from MENATEP

Having begun to actively attract funds from the public, the bank tried to convince clients that Trust was a “tough nut to crack.”

Credit notes were just one way of masking holes in the Trust's capital. The history of this bank began in 1995 as a St. Petersburg subsidiary of the Moscow MENATEP bank, controlled by Mikhail Khodorkovsky. MENATEP did not survive the crisis of 1998: in May 1999 its license was revoked, and in September of the same year it was declared bankrupt: its debt to creditors amounted to about 40 billion rubles. After this, part of MENATEP's assets was transferred to MENATEP St. Petersburg and another Trust and Investment Bank (DIB) controlled by Khodorkovsky. According to banki.ru, MENATEP St. Petersburg received the bank's branch network and card business, and DIB received the majority of YUKOS' financial flows.

In October 2003, searches were carried out at the MENATEP St. Petersburg office as part of the YUKOS criminal case. Almost simultaneously in "MENATEP St. Petersburg" and investment bank"Trust" (this is the name DIB received) has changed its board. Chairman of the Board of Menatep St. Petersburg Dmitry Lebedev left his post. Ilya Yurov, who previously served as Chairman of the Board of Trust, was elected Chairman of the Board of Directors of both banks. At that time, both banks were at the top of the ratings of the largest banks in the country: the Trust investment bank took 17th place in terms of equity capital (5.18 billion rubles) and 15th in terms of net assets (36.74 billion rubles .), "MENATEP St. Petersburg" is 23rd in terms of equity capital (4.12 billion rubles) and 14th in terms of net assets (42.42 billion rubles).

In May 2004, the top management of the banks, led by Yurov, bought both assets from the MENATEP group, and the head office was transferred to Moscow. In 2005, MENATEP St. Petersburg was renamed into the national bank Trust: the banks operated under a common brand until 2008, when they merged into one national bank Trust.

The bank began to actively attract funds from the public, and emphasized its reliability with the help of images of brutal celebrities. In 2009, the face of the bank’s advertising campaign was the athlete, actor and showman Vladimir Turchinsky, and from 2010 to 2014 the bank was advertised by Bruce Willis.

Clearly, the problems of the Trust emerged in 2014. Although, as the Vedomosti newspaper wrote at the end of 2014, everything was clear to the bank’s auditors back in 2009. Vedomosti received a report prepared by auditors Ernst & Young (today EY) on the failed deal: in 2009, Trust shareholders negotiated a merger with the All-Russian Regional Development Bank (a subsidiary bank of Rosneft). According to Vedomosti, which reviewed the report, in mid-2009 60% loan portfolio"Trust", amounting to 65 billion rubles. after deducting reserves, accounted for parties related to the bank. More than 60% of such loans were issued for projects of the bank’s largest beneficiaries - Chairman of the Board of Directors Ilya Yurov, members of the Board of Directors Nikolai Fetisov and Sergei Belyaev. The remaining share was spent on restructuring problem loans of shareholders and loans to friendly structures in order to maintain Central Bank standards.

In addition, auditors Ernst & Young discovered that Trust received subordinated loans, which allowed the bank to increase capital, through an illegal self-financing scheme. Credit notes issued under this scheme were precisely those offered to Trust clients.

In 2009, the Fitch Ratings agency also drew attention to the opacity of some of the bank's assets and its relations with its largest borrowers. In July 2010, it assigned Trust a long-term “possible default” rating, after which the bank refused to cooperate with the agency.

Throughout 2014, when Trust's problems became obvious, the bank several times approached the minimum core capital adequacy ratio of 5%. This first happened in March 2014, after which the bank raised RUB 3.14 billion in capital. through an additional issue of shares. But this “Trust” only lasted for six months: in September 2014, it again approached the critical point. In December, the bank planned to increase capital through an additional issue of 1.4 billion rubles, but the deal was cash-free - the shares were paid for by the building that the bank rents for the main office. The bank was finished off by the panic of depositors, who at the end of 2014 took money from banks. The outflow of deposits from Trust was small - about 3 billion rubles, but this was enough. On December 22, 2014, the Central Bank decided to reorganize the bank.

According to data as of December 1, 2014, deposits in Trust amounted to more than 144 billion rubles; in terms of the volume of funds of the population of the banks being rehabilitated, Trust took second place after the Bank of Moscow (147 billion rubles of funds of the population at the time of the decision to reorganize) .

The bank is interesting in all respects

Former Trust shareholders Ilya Yurov (left) and Nikolai Fetisov (right) were arrested in absentia, their current place of residence remains a secret

FC Otkritie Bank was chosen as the sanator of the Trust, which received 127 billion rubles for this program. from the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA). As the DIA reported, one of the key selection criteria was the “smallest amount of funds” allocated for financial recovery. DIA General Director Yuri Isaev stated in December 2014 that “the 127 billion rubles allocated by the Bank of Russia for the rehabilitation of Trust Bank will be enough.” However, a year later, Otkritie turned to the DIA for an additional amount to rehabilitate Trust, requesting another 47 billion rubles. Initially, the size of the hole in the bank was estimated at 68 billion rubles, but a few months later the volume of the shortage increased by 70% - to 114 billion rubles.

According to sources of the Kommersant newspaper, this growth was explained by the fact that the schemes for “inflating” capital on the part of the former owners stopped working, and half of the shortfall was made up of “scheme” assets.

As Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank Mikhail Sukhov stated at the stage of making the decision on reorganization, the Trust’s reporting was falsified. In April 2015, the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for Moscow opened a criminal case on particularly large-scale fraud (Part 4 of Article 159 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) against former top managers of Trust. The former and... O. chairman of the board of the bank Oleg Dikusar and financial director Evgeny Romakov. According to investigators, the accused entered into fictitious agreements with legal entities registered in Cyprus, and from 2012 to 2014 transferred them 7.05 billion rubles. and $118.3 million. Then the money was transferred to the accounts of individuals and legal entities associated with the Trust.

The suspects, according to investigators, were not alone: ​​former shareholders of Trust - Ilya Yurov, Nikolai Fetisov and Sergei Belyaev - were arrested in absentia by a Russian court. But by that time, the bank’s beneficiaries had not been in Russia for a long time: apparently, they left the country immediately after the decision on reorganization. It is not known exactly where they are now, presumably in the UK and the USA.

There are several precedents in the Trust case. Firstly, the bank is suing the former owners. Only the DIA has experience in prosecuting former owners in foreign courts, which achieved in a British court the seizure of the foreign assets of the founder of Mezhprombank, Sergei Pugachev. In the same court it was possible to achieve similar solution and "Trust", and now a claim for damages in the amount of $830 million will be considered there: "Trust" believes that the former owners issued loans to their own companies offshore. Trust is suing a number of Cypriot companies associated with former owners in Moscow arbitration: according to Interfax, the total amount of claims is more than 37 billion rubles.

Another precedent is a repeated competition for reorganization. Otkritie has already applied for “additional” funding, but the Central Bank and the DIA now believe that additional funds should not be allocated without a competition. If Otkritie receives the requested 47 billion, the reorganization of Trust will become the largest in history (174 billion rubles). So far, the record holder is Mosoblbank, with more than 172 billion rubles allocated for its rehabilitation.

The results of the competition are expected to be announced on June 17. Of the major financial and credit organizations, Alfa Bank showed interest in it. According to the press service of Otkritie Holding, the group will also take part in the competition. This means that the Central Bank has no serious complaints about the financial recovery procedure carried out by Otkritie, which means it is unlikely to change the sanatorium. “If Otkrytie remains the sanatorium of Trust and does not receive additional money for this, the group will certainly cope with financial recovery, it has large resources, the only problem is whether then this project will be profitable for Otkritie,”— notes managing partner of NAFI Pavel Samiev.

The reorganization of Trust and the allocation of additional funding for it, meanwhile, aroused claims from the Prosecutor General's Office. In April, she sent a submission to the Central Bank, noting that the regulator, in principle, has not developed criteria for selecting investors, and the possibilities, procedure and basis for additional financing are not limited in any way. “The main complaint about all these stories with additional allocation of money is the complete opacity of the entire reorganization process,” agrees Pavel Samiev.

In particular, the situation with payments on those same credit notes is unclear. According to Radik Lotfullin, who refers to the DIA's participation plan in the Trust bankruptcy procedure, the money for payments to note holders was included in the reorganization plan. According to the bank's reports, in 2015 it reserved 27.1 billion rubles for these purposes. However, in May, Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation Mikhail Sukhov said that the bank could receive partial compensation for losses on credit notes. In general, whether there was money and where it was is a big question.